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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
I. Introduction
In what surely was a gloriously naive fit of optimism, the United
States Supreme Court in 1997 extolled the Internet as a "new
marketplace of ideas"' replete with "vast democratic fora."2 Just five
years later, a much more ominous "marketplace" reality had replaced
that radiant rhetoric. 3  "It is clear that a new marketplace for child
pornography has emerged in the dark comers of cyberspace," lamented
Attorney General John Ashcroft in March 2002.4 He was announcing the
breakup that month of an Internet child pornography ring known as
"Candyman" and the filing of federal charges against nearly ninety
people for trafficking in this most reviled form of speech.
At the same time that this federal sting was made public, the United
States Supreme Court was mulling over a controversial new definition of
child pornography that would expand the concept to include a computer-
generated image that "appears to be" of a minor engaged in sexual
activity. 6 Child pornography was first held by the Court to fall outside
the scope of First Amendment 7 protection twenty years earlier.8  The
Court had heard oral argument regarding the constitutionality of the
Child Pornography Prevention Act's regulation of so-called virtual child
1. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
2. Id. at 868.
3. The marketplace of ideas referred to by the United States Supreme Court in the
opening sentence of this article "is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech
tradition." RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992); see W. Wat
Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 JOURNALISM & MASS
COMM. Q. 40 (1996) (providing a review of the United States Supreme Court's use of the
marketplace metaphor).
4. Wayne Washington, Web Child Porn Raids by FBI Yield Arrests, Ashcroft
Announces, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 19, 2002, at A2.
5. Cheryl W. Thompson, FBI Cracks Child Porn Ring Based on Internet, WASH.
POST, Mar. 19, 2002, at A02.
6. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 531 U.S. 1124 (2001) (considering the constitutionality of the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, which regulates "child pornography computer
images that do not involve the use of real children in their production"). The Child
Pornography Prevention Act marked "the first time that Congress banned the sale and
distribution of images that do not feature real people." FREDERICK S. LANE III, OBSCENE
PROFITS: THE ENTREPRENEURS OF PORNOGRAPHY IN THE CYBER AGE 126-27 (2000).
7. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part
that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses have been incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local
government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
8. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The mere possession of child
pornography also falls outside the scope of First Amendment protection. See Osborne v.
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 120 (1990).
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pornography 9 in October 2001,10 but did not strike down the law as
overbroad until some six months later in April 2002.
The essential definitional issue of child pornography is the question
of how to define one of the most loathed categories of speech in the
United States,12 and it stretches far beyond the particular case of virtual
child pornography. In fact, it pervades any attempt to define it. Thus,
while the United States Supreme Court articulated a precise definition of
obscenity, 3 it never established "a single one-size-fits-all constitutional
definition of child pornography."'
' 4
But definitions do exist. There is, of course, a well-established
federal statutory definition of child pornography.' 5 That law explicates
child pornography in terms of a minor engaging in "sexually explicit
conduct,"'16 which is characterized, in turn, as sexual intercourse,
including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether
between persons of the same or opposite sex; bestiality; masturbation;
sadistic or masochistic abuse; or a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area.' 7  States also have their own unique definitions of child
pornography. 18 Some states even have definitions for the specific crime
9. According to a recent story in the Los Angeles Times, it is very easy to create
such images:
Advances in computer technology have allowed photo enthusiasts, artists and
moviemakers to create images that are nearly indistinguishable from reality.
Pedophiles have embraced the same technology. Using easily available
programs, such as Adobe Photoshop, pedophiles have poured out a flood of
fake erotic photographs, in which one person's head, often a young celebrity's,
is electronically pasted onto another person's body.
P.J. Huffstutter, 'Virtual' Porn: Born of Digital Wizardry, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at
A14.
10. See generally Joan Biskupic, Court Debates Ban on Faked Child Porn, USA
TODAY, Oct. 31, 2001, at 12A (observing that "the justices seemed skeptical" during oral
argument of the law banning virtual child pornography); Lyle Denniston, Court Hears
Child Pornography Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 2001, at A2 (describing oral argument
in the case involving virtual child pornography).
11. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
12. Cf Kimberly A. McCabe, Reports and Communications: Child Pornography
and the Internet, 18 Soc. ScI. COMPUTER REV. 73, 73 (2000) (observing that, "[w]hen it
comes to punishment of those few convicted in connection with child pornography,
today's citizens and the law enforcement stress very punitive interventions").
13. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
14. United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 69 (lst Cir. 1999).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2002).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 2256(2)(A)-(E).
18. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.3 (Deering 2001) (setting forth
California's law regarding the sexual exploitation of children in films, photographs,
videotapes and other media); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1 (2001) (providing Illinois's
statutory definition of child pornography); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1463.02 (2001)
(describing acts that constitute child pornography under Nebraska's Child Pornography
Prevention Act); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312 (2001) (defining the sexual abuse of
2002]
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of "computer child pornography," targeting the seduction of minors via
computer messages to engage in sexual conduct.' 
9
Legal definitions aside, others argue that child pornography should
be defined more broadly to include "posed photographs of naked and
semi-naked children., 20 Such a normative definition-a definition based
on how child pornography should be or ought to be categorized rather
than how it actually is categorized-contrasts with the much more
precise and explicit federal definition set forth above.2 1
Perhaps the disagreement on how child pornography should be
defined-whether it should include virtual images, whether nudity of
children by itself should be enough to constitute pornography, or whether
nudity should even be necessary-is the result of a much larger problem
identified by Philip Jenkins in his recent book Beyond Tolerance: Child
Pornography and the Internet.22 Jenkins, a professor of History and
Religious Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, writes that "the
child porn problem remains largely unconstructed.,23  This point is
crucial. If the problem of child pornography itself is unconstructed and
not well understood, then it is no surprise that the definition of child
pornography is problematic and contested. Phrased differently, and more
bluntly, if we don't fully know what we are dealing with, then we cannot
very well define it.
This article addresses these twin issues: the unconstructed problem
of child pornography and the definitional dilemma faced by legislative
bodies that attempt to regulate it. Part II proposes a controversial 24 way
to begin curing the "unconstructed" nature of the child pornography
problem. In particular, this part calls for a First Amendment-based
academic research privilege that would provide scholars with the ability
to study child pornography by examining the topic firsthand, including
the opportunity to analyze and critique this form of image-based content,
free from fear of state and federal government prosecution. 25  The
adoption of such a constitutional privilege is important. In order to
children to include child pornography).
19. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-603 (2001) (defining the crime of computer child
pornography in Arkansas).
20. Tim Tate, The Child Pornography Industry: International Trade in Child Sexual
Abuse, in PORNOGRAPHY: WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 203, 203 (Catherine
Itzin ed., 1992).
21. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
22. PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET
(2001).
23. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
24. The proposed privilege would be controversial to the extent that it allows
professors and other researchers to violate what are otherwise generally applicable
criminal laws.
25. See infra Part II.
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construct the problem of child pornography that Professor Jenkins
identifies, one must first understand and study it. Academic and
scholarly insight, in turn, might well facilitate the creation of better and
more effective legal definitions and mechanisms to control child
pornography. The trouble today, however, is that scholars rarely venture
into "the dark comers of cyberspace, 26 where child pornography lurks,
because they fear facing criminal sanctions.
Part III examines a new phenomenon involving the possible sexual
exploitation of minors-the proliferation of child modeling Web
sites27-to illustrate the broader problems with defining child
pornography.28 In the process, this part describes, critiques, and analyzes
a new federal bill designed to eradicate their existence. The modeling
sites, which were first brought to public light by Wired magazine in July
2001,29 captured national media attention in 2002 when MSNBC did an
expos6 on their proliferation.3° In May 2002, less than one month after
the Court struck down the federal law against virtual child
pornography,3' Representative Mark Foley, of the Sixteenth District of
Florida, sponsored the Child Modeling Exploitation Prevention Act of
2002.32 This bill would make it a federal crime to operate such child
modeling sites.33 In announcing the bill, Representative Foley, a
Republican, said that the modeling sites are "nothing more than a way
for pedophiles to get their fix." 34 State legislators are also starting to take
notice of these sites.35 However, the nascent dilemma posed by the sites
is that they that do not fit neatly into the unprotected speech categories of
obscenity, child pornography, or any other classification falling outside
the ambit of First Amendment protection.36
26. See Washington, supra note 4; supra text accompanying note 4.
27. A list of such sites can be found on a Web page called "Child Super Models."
Child Super Models, at http://www.childsupermodels.com (last visited May 13, 2002).
28. See infra Part III.
29. Julia Scheeres, Girl Model Sites Crossing Line?, WIRED, July 23, 2001, at
http://www.wired.com/news/ebiz/0, I 272,45346,FF.html.
30. Mike Bunker, 'Legal Child Porn' Under Fire, MSNBC, Mar. 28, 2002, at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/730491.asp.
31. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
32. H.R. 4667, 107th Cong. (2002).
33. Press Release, Office of Rep. Mark Foley, Congressional Children's Council
Introduces Child Crime Package (Sept. 18, 2002), available at http://www.gop.gov/item-
news.asp?N=20020918135409.
34. Andy Sullivan, Lawmakers Taking Aim at Child Modeling Sites, HOUSTON
CHRON., May 8, 2002, at A16.
35. See Helen Kennedy, Queens Lawmakers Push To Ax Kid Model Web Sites,
DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), May 11, 2002, at 8 (writing that "[t]wo Queen lawmakers plan to
introduce a bill in the state Legislature on Monday that would outlaw using kids for child
modeling Web sites").
36. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1399 (stating that the First Amendment
2002]
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This article concludes that only after scholars and politicians learn
more about the problem of child pornography, a goal that is
accomplished by giving scholars a privilege to investigate it for academic
purposes, will definitional problems like those raised by preteen
modeling sites and the language of the Child Modeling Exploitation
Prevention Act diminish.37
II. An Academic Research Privilege: The Need To Study Child
Pornography
It is illegal to possess child pornography in the United States.38 This
clear legal reality makes obscure the cultural reality of child
pornography. In particular, it makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
study thoroughly the scope of the child pornography problem. To know
what is out there and traded on the World Wide Web, and to understand
the range of content depicting minors, one surely must be able to view
the images. But, at present, no First Amendment-based academic
research privilege exists to makes it permissible for scholars to engage in
such activity, and federal child pornography statutes do not provide
academics with a defense.
39
This stark fact was brought home when Professor Jenkins was
conducting research for his 2001 book Beyond Tolerance: Child
Pornography on the Internet.40  Professor Jenkins authored an entire
book of more than two hundred and fifty pages on the topic of child
pornography without ever looking at a single image of child
pornography. Why did he avert his eyes from the very topic that he was
researching? Because Professor Jenkins shared what he described as
"the general reluctance to risk legal consequences" from looking at
sexually explicit images of minors.41 With the avenue of images legally
foreclosed, Professor Jenkins's book was "therefore based on verbal,
textual material collected from newsgroups and message boards over the
last two years. ' 42 To effectuate this, he used software that substituted
"does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement,
obscenity, and pornography produced with real children").
37. See infra Part IV.
38. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
39. The relevant federal statutes do offer one affirmative defense for the possession
of child pornography, but it applies only to those who possessed less than three images
and who either took reasonable steps to promptly destroy them or promptly "reported the
matter to a law enforcement agency and afforded that agency access to each such visual
depiction." 18 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(2)(B) (2002); see also id. § 2252A(d)(2)(B).
40. See JENKINS, supra note 22.
41. Id. at 19.
42. Id. at 20.
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generic icons in place of photographs and images, leaving only text.43
But this method of research-studying child pornography without
looking at child pornography-is far from perfect or desirable. Professor
Jenkins wrote that one "difficulty with this text-only approach is that I do
not know from firsthand observation exactly what the material is that I
am supposed to be handling, whether what is advertised as child
pornography in fact features subjects age five or thirty-five." 44 Jenkins
thus freely acknowledged in his book: "I recognize that I am falling far
short of the kind of direct observation that would normally be demanded
in reporting such a study.
' ' 5
To ameliorate the predicament experienced by scholars like
Professor Jenkins, this article calls for the adoption by the judiciary of a
First Amendment-based academic research privilege. This privilege
would shield scholars studying child pornography from prosecution
under both federal and state statutes. Section A describes the need for
such a privilege, while sections B, C, and D lay the constitutional,
judicial, and statutory foundations upon which this privilege could be
constructed. Section E then describes a missed opportunity by the
United States Supreme Court to fashion a very similar privilege for
investigative journalists when it denied certiorari in the case of Matthews
v. United States.46  Finally, section F articulates the contours of the
academic research privilege.
A. The Need for Fashioning a Research Privilege
Justice Potter Stewart once famously proclaimed that, when it came
to hard-core pornography, "I know it when I see it. ' '47 Unfortunately for
law-abiding scholars studying the phenomenon of child pornography on
the World Wide Web and elsewhere, they won't know it because they
won't ever see it. That is because the federal child pornography statutes
do not carve out a legitimate-use exception or defense for academic
researchers studying these images.48 Given the interstate nature of the
World Wide Web, this makes federal child pornography laws applicable
to almost any instance of Internet-based communication.
Why should scholars be allowed to study these images? Several
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 22.
46. 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910 (2000).
47. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
48. See 18 U.S.C §§ 2252-2252A (2002) (providing one affirmative defense for
those who possess less than three images and who either promptly destroy them or notify




reasons readily come to mind. First, if scholars are not allowed to view
child pornography for legitimate research purposes, then society is left
largely to rely on two sources for its data about both the quantity and
content of child pornography that circulates on the World Wide Web:
the government and pedophiles. 49  Both sources may be viewed as
dubious, each constituting its own somewhat suspect class. Many people
do not trust the government or law enforcement agents, and certainly
even more people scorn pedophiles as sexual deviants. 50 In other words,
we are forced to put our trust in those who either enforce the laws of
child pornography or those who break the laws of child pornography.
Between these two extremes of law-enforcer and law-breaker,
scholars would serve as an independent and neutral source of information
about child pornography. They could study the topic objectively without
being bound up in the desire to catch law-breakers. They could tell us
whether the material that is posted on the World Wide Web is, in fact, as
prolific and problematic as Attorney General John Ashcroft suggests it
is. 5' How much is out there is disputed, as "statistics on the prevalence
of child pornography vary dramatically. 52  Scholars could tell us, via
systematic study in the research tradition known as content analysis,
53
what does exist in a manner more comprehensive than law enforcement
officials could provide. The only evidence, in turn, that pedophiles could
possibly provide would be purely anecdotal, based on their own
decidedly non-systematic experiences and observations.
A second reason to create an academic research privilege for the
study of child pornography is because there is some dispute about
whether the images that are posted on the World Wide Web today are
images that have been around for quite some time or whether they are
newly created images.5 4 Put differently, does the alleged "explosion of
child pornography on the Internet ' 5 5 reflect a concomitant explosion in
49. Pedophilia "is a distinct sexual orientation marked by persistent, sometimes
exclusive, attraction to prepubescent children." John Cloud, Pedophilia, TIME, Apr. 29,
2002, at 42.
50. See generally Jeffrey Kluger, Why Do They Target Kids?; The Molesters' Mind-
Set, TIME, Apr. 1, 2002, at 37 (writing that "[t]he best thing most people say about
pedophiles-whether they're found in the Roman Catholic Church or outside it-is that
they're just plain sick").
51. Washington, supra note 4; see supra text accompanying note 4.
52. Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209,
231 (2001).
53. "Content analysis is a research method for systematically analyzing and making
inferences from text." RUSSELL K. SCHUTr, INVESTIGATING THE SOCIAL WORLD: THE
PROCESS AND PRACTICE OF RESEARCH 329 (3d ed. 2001).
54. See United States v. Stevens, 29 F. Supp. 2d 592, 595 (D. Alaska 1998).
55. Jason Hitt, Note, Child Pornography and Technology: The Troubling Analysis of
United States v. Mohrbacher, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2001).
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the production of child pornography or does it reflect the new duplication
and dissemination of an aging catalogue of images? If there is a new
wave of production of child pornography, then there clearly is a problem
that must be addressed immediately. If, on the other hand, the Web is
merely a new venue for an old product, then the problem may be less
pressing, at least from the perspective that there is not a new generation
of children being exploited in the production of child pornography.
In a recent case involving federal prosecution of an individual for
possessing child pornography, an FBI agent testified that he "estimated
that the bulk of images currently in circulation were produced and placed
in circulation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, continuing into the 1980s
and even the 1990s.,,56 Based in part on this testimony, a federal district
court judge concluded that "it is reasonable to infer that any given image
downloaded from a computer and possessed in 1995 originated prior to
1977 in the absence of some indication that a particular image is of more
recent vintage. '57
Research by scholars familiar with photography and photographic
techniques, as well as visual clues lurking in photographs, could prove
extremely useful in either confirming or denying this conclusion about
the relative age of child pornography posted and traded on the Internet.
There is some evidence to deny the conclusion. For instance, Professor
Jenkins in Beyond Tolerance seemed to contradict the testimony of the
FBI agent quoted above when he wrote that "a striking amount" of hard-
core child pornography is produced "from very recent times, right up to
the present day.''58 Just how much equals a striking amount is, of course,
unclear since Professor Jenkins could not examine the material to make
an independent evaluation.
59
A third reason to provide scholars with a First Amendment-based
research privilege builds on the two reasons described above. In
particular, scholars who study child pornography on the Web would be
able to play the role of valuable, neutral sources of information not
directly tied to law enforcement agencies. These neutral sources could
testify before congressional subcommittees and state legislative bodies
considering proposed revisions to child pornography statutes. Better
knowledge via better testimony provided by neutral sources of
information could well shape better laws. If, for instance, scholars
discover that much of the child pornography on the Web today is freshly
produced, then new laws, or at least new enforcement efforts, could be
56. Stevens, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
57. Id. at 595 n.4.
58. JENKINS, supra note 22, at 82.
59. Id. at 20-22.
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made to address this problem.
A fourth reason for fashioning an academic research privilege is
simple: child pornography is an increasingly important issue today. 60 It
recently captured the attention of three powerful institutions in the
United States: the judiciary, law enforcement, and the media. As noted
in the introduction of this article, the United States Supreme Court in
2002 considered and struck down a statute that expanded the definition
of child pornography.61 In addition to judicial scrutiny, law enforcement
is giving heightened attention to child pornography, as witnessed by the
federal "Candyman" sting operation 62 and other recent crackdowns such
as "Operation Web Sweep. 63 Furthermore, in 2002 the media devoted
attention to the rash of priests from the Roman Catholic Church exposed
for allegedly molesting children, and the media sometimes drew a link
between child pornography and molestation.64
Now, child pornography should receive similar attention from
academic researchers who routinely study other forms of controversial
media images such as those depicting graphic violence.65 Just as
60. That child pornography is an increasingly serious issue is driven home by the
fact that child pornographers are getting younger and the very real possibility, according
to law enforcement officials, that there could soon be "live child molestations"
transmitted via the Internet. Michael S. Rosenwald, Child Porn Purveyors Get
Younger-The New Generation Taps Internet's Power, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2002, at
BI.
61. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
62. Supra note 5 and accompanying text.
63. See Anthony M. DeStefano, Child Porn Arrests Made, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May
11, 2002, at A7 (describing Operation Web Sweep as "an international roundup of
suspects" who are believed "to have possessed or trafficked in child porn"); Web-Based
Child Porn Sting Leads to Raids on 200 Homes, RECORD (Bergen Co., N.J.), May 9,
2002, at A4 (describing the Operation Web Sweep sting operation run jointly by New
Jersey, federal and international law enforcement officials that involved the operation of
a Web site).
64. In some cases, media attention was given to specific priests arrested for child
molestation who also were found to possess child pornography. See generally Tim
O'Neil, Beine Remains in St. Louis Jail; His Lawyer Will Seek Reduced Bond, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 25, 2002,.at,A1O (reporting on the case of James A. Beine who
allegedly stored child pornography on computer disks). In other cases, the connection
between child pornography and child molestation by priests was analyzed more broadly
by the media in side-bar stories about pedophilia. See generally Robyn Suriano, The
Medical Mystery of Pedophilia, SEATTLE TIMEs, Apr. 28, 2002, at J6 (observing that
pedophilia "is a sexual disorder linked to the recent disclosures of Roman Catholic priests
molesting children" and writing that "[m]any pedophiles use a variety of outlets for their
desires such as collecting child pornography"); Karen Thomas, Who Are the Child
Molesters Among Us?, USA TODAY, Mar. 12, 2002, at 7D (writing, in the context of an
article about pedophilia that observes that "the clergy allows for a level of authority
unparalleled in any other profession that deals with children," that "[t]he link between
child pornography and child molestation is strong").
65. See Barbara Wilson et al., Violence in Children's Television Programming:
Assessing the Risks, 52 J. COMM. 5, 5 (2002) (writing that "[c]oncern about the impact of
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scholars today conduct content analyses of violent images in television
programs 66 and music videos,67 and study the effects of playing violent
video games, 68 they too should be allowed to study images of child
sexuality and sexual activity in the media without fearing prosecution.
The studies would tell the government and the public what exists and
how much exists. The government clearly fears the effects of violent
imagery in the media, and legislative bodies sometimes cite academic
research to support their desire to curb it.69  There is no reason why
academic research on the scope and nature of child pornography would
not prove similarly useful for legislative bodies.
B. The Constitutional Roots of a Research Privilege
The constitutional roots of a research privilege for academics to
study otherwise illegal forms of child pornography are grounded in the
First Amendment.7° In particular, the Free Speech and Free Press
Clauses have been held by the United States Supreme Court to include
TV violence on children has become one of the nation's most prominent issues during
recent years" and that "[p]ublic opinion about the impact of television violence is
bolstered by a great deal of academic research").
66. See generally Stacy L. Smith et al., Prime-Time Television: Assessing Violence
During the Most Popular Viewing Hours, 52 J. CoMM. 84 (2002) (presenting a content
analysis of violence in prime-time television shows).
67. See generally Stacy L. Smith & Aaron R. Boyson, Violence in Music Videos:
Examining the Prevalence and Context of Physical Aggression, 52 J. COMM. 61 (2002)
(presenting an analysis of violence in music video programming).
68. See generally Craig A. Anderson & Karen E. Dill, Video Games and Aggressive
Thoughts, Feelings, and Behavior in the Laboratory and in Life, 78 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 772 (2000) (describing two studies examining violent video game effects
on aggression-related variables); Mary E. Ballard & Robert Lineberger, Video Game
Violence and Confederate Gender: Effects on Reward and Punishment Given by College
Males, 41 SEx ROLES J. RES. 541 (1999) (examining reward and punishment behavior
among college males following video game play).
69. The City of Indianapolis, for instance, attempted to justify a statute restricting
minors' access to video games featuring violent content by offering into evidence a pair
of psychological studies about video games. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick,
244 F.3d 572, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 462 (2001); see Clay
Calvert, Violence, Video Games, and a Voice of Reason: Judge Posner to the Defense of
Kids' Culture and the First Amendment, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 17-20 (2002)
(discussing the use of social science evidence in American Amusement Machine
Association).
70. The First Amendment is one source of the right of academic freedom. At times,
other amendments have been held to support this right. See WILLIAM A. KAPLAN &
BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 301 (3d ed. 1995) (writing that, "in
the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court gave academic freedom constitutional
status under the First Amendment freedoms of speech and association, and to a lesser
extent under the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of procedural due process").
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the "freedom of inquiry' 71 and "the freedom of the entire university
community." 72 Phrased differently, the First Amendment contains an
unenumerated right to know 7 3 and, in the context of public colleges and
universities, a concomitant unenumerated right of academic freedom
74
that facilitates this right to know.
75
Forty-five years ago, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,76 the Court held
that the "essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident" and admonished that "[t]eachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding." 77 A constitutional privilege that
protects professors and scholars who study child pornography would
promote the freedom of inquiry and facilitate the understanding
described in Sweezy. It would also add teeth to the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Keyishian v. Board of Regents78 that academic
freedom is a "transcendent value" to which "[o]ur nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding.
'" 79
It is important to point out that the Supreme Court in Sweezy
observed that "[n]o field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by
man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. This is particularly true in
the social sciences where few, if any, principles are accepted as
absolutes. 8 °  It is precisely in social science fields such as
communications where new discoveries about the quantity, quality, and
effects of media messages are made. Child pornography is, from an
71. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
72. Id.
73. See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION
254 (1983) (writing that "[s]ome argue that the First Amendment presupposes the
existence of the public's right to know"). See generally C. THOMAS DIENES ET AL.,
NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW 11 (2d ed. 1999).
[T]he beguiling phrase 'the right to know' straddles the often fine line between
governmental restriction on the right to receive information, which the freedom
of expression principle typically will not tolerate, and an affirmative right to
compel government to disclose that which it would prefer to hold in
confidence, a right that has not traditionally been held to be secured by the First
Amendment.
Id.
74. Academic freedom is "not a specifically enumerated constitutional right." Univ.
of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
75. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 411-12 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1070 (2001) (observing "that homage has been paid to the ideal of academic
freedom in a number of Supreme Court opinions, often with reference to the First
Amendment").
76. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
77. Id. at 250.
78. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
79. Id. at 603.
80. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
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objective social science perspective, just another form of media message
worthy of neutral and detached study. In fact, it is particularly worthy of
study given its controversial nature.
An academic freedom-based research privilege to study otherwise
illegal images does more, of course, than facilitate university research. It
also enhances university teaching. Professors who generate knowledge
through their research activities, in turn, transmit this knowledge to their
students in the classroom, thereby improving the quality of material
disseminated in this collegiate marketplace of ideas cherished by the
Supreme Court.8 '
According to the Court, debate in this marketplace of ideas, whether
it is within the confines of the college classroom or outside the halls of
academia, must be informed.82 As Justice Powell wrote in dissent in
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,83 "public debate must not only be
unfettered; it must also be informed. For that reason this Court has
repeatedly stated that the First Amendment concerns encompass the
receipt of information and ideas as well as the right of expression.,
84
The academic research privilege proposed here would lead to facts that
inform public debate about child pornography (a debate that heated up
when the Supreme Court decided to protect virtual child pornography 85)
and would provide the public and legislators with the information and
ideas they need to inform the creation of better and more effective laws.
The infusion of information from neutral academic sources into the
marketplace of ideas would help to ensure that debate on the public issue
of child pornography is more than just an "uninhibited, robust and wide-
open"'86 rhetorical free-for-all, but that it is the wise and informed ideal
espoused by Alexander Meiklejohn. 87
81. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (writing that "the college
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas"').
82. Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J. dissenting).
83. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
84. Id. at 862-63.
85. See generally John Schwartz, Swift, Passionate Reaction to Pornography Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at A18 (calling the reaction to the Supreme Court's decision
to strike down the Child Pornography Prevention Act "swift and passionate" and quoting
a Republican member of Congress as stating that the Court "sided with pedophiles over
children").
86. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
87. Educator and free-speech theorist Alexander Meiklejohn wrote that "self-
government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity,
sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is
assumed to express." Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961
SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255. The information supplied by academics on the child
pornography issue would serve this ideal.
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C. The Judicial Roots of a Research Privilege
The judicial underpinnings of an academic research privilege to
study child pornography can be found in the same Supreme Court
opinion, New York v. Ferber,8 8 that held this variety of speech to fall
outside the scope of First Amendment protection.89 Justice Byron White,
writing the opinion of the Court, began by observing: "in recent years,
the exploitive use of children in the production of pornography has
become a serious national problem."90
The key words in this statement are "exploitive use." That was the
primary concern of the Court in forbidding child pornography, as it
reiterated later in the opinion when it wrote that "[t]he prevention of
sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government
objective of surpassing importance." 91 As recently as April 2002, the
Court reiterated that it is "the sexual abuse of children" that justifies the
unprotected status of child pornography.92
The study of existing child pornography by professors and others in
academia, however, does not constitute an exploitative use of either
children or child pornography. 93 Indeed, academic research on the topic
could actually inform legislation designed to curb or to redress such
exploitive uses. In this case, then, the harms that justify the prohibition
on child pornography possession and distribution disappear.
The story would be different, of course, if academic researchers
chose to study the effects of the production of child pornography on
minors by actually photographing or filming minors engaged in sexual
activities and then seeing how those minors react. This would constitute
a direct exploitation of minors for the sake of generating knowledge.
Such an experiment, however, would never be allowed by human
subjects committees who carefully review and pre-screen any and all
experiments and studies involving human subjects.
The scope of an academic research privilege thus must be limited to
studying photographs, images, films, and videotapes that already exist
independently of the researcher. The academic researcher's use, in these
circumstances, would be considered downstream, removed from the
actual exploitation of the children involved in the production of the
88. 458 U.S. 474 (1982).
89. See id. at 749-50, 757.
90. Id. at 749 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 757.
92. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1401 (2002).
93. As discussed later in the article, an academic study involving child pornography
would not involve actually photographing or filming minors, meaning that it would not
produce more pornography.
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94images. 4
In addition to the majority opinion in Ferber, Justice Stevens's
concurrence in that case also lays the groundwork for an academic
research privilege.95 Justice Stevens wrote: "The character of the State's
interest in protecting children from sexual abuse justifies the imposition
of criminal sanctions against those who profit, directly or indirectly,
from the promotion of such films."96  Academics studying child
pornography, of course, do not profit monetarily from examining such
films. Justice Stevens, therefore, believed that "the exhibition of these
films before a legislative committee studying a proposed amendment to a
state law, or before a group of research scientists studying human
behavior, could not... be made a crime. 97 Within this language lies the
seed of an academic research privilege. Unfortunately, Justice Stevens's
opinion was merely a concurrence in judgment without precedential
value, and, furthermore, his concurrence was not joined by other
98Justices.
At least one lower federal court, however, has cited Justice
Stevens's language favorably.99 In United States v. Lamb,'00 a federal
district court in New York held that the defendant "may well advance the
argument that his possession of child pornography was pursuant to
research he was undertaking in his capacity as a psychiatrist at the
Auburn Correctional Facility." 10 1 In reaching this conclusion, the court
wrote in a footnote:
The legislative history accompanying the Protection of Children Act
reveals that the Senate relied on the research of Robin Lloyd, who
authored a book on boy prostitution. She "documented the existence
of over 260 different magazines which depict children engaging in
sexually explicit conduct." It is difficult to imagine how a researcher
today could catalog so many publications of this sort without running
afoul of the child pornography law. The answer is that such activity
may be protected by the Constitution. 102
This language from Lamb must be seized by appellate-level courts
to create a First Amendment-based academic research privilege. At least
94. This limitation on the scope of the privilege and other conditions/limitations are
discussed later. See supra Part II.F.
95. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 777-78 (Stevens, J., concurring).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 778 (emphasis added).
98. See id. at 777.
99. See United States v. Lamb, 945 F. Supp. 441, 450 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing
Justice Stevens's concurrence in Ferber).
100. 945 F. Supp. 441 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
101. Id.at450.
102. Id. at 450 n.4 (citations omitted).
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one district court in Washington has recognized such a defense,
10 3
although not a privilege, and a district court in Maine indicated that, in
some instances involving research at the university level, defendants in
child pornography cases should be able to assert a "literary purpose"
defense. 04
While some courts thus seem willing to adopt at least limited types
of defenses to child pornography charges for academic or scholarly
research, the next section turns to state statutes that afford protection to
certain individuals using this form of content for particular purposes.
D. The State Statutory Roots of a Research Privilege
While the federal child pornography statutes do not provide
academic researchers with an exemption from their reach, some state
statutes either create such an exemption or contain provisions that
recognize exemptions for certain legitimate uses. 10 5 Courts considering
whether to create a First Amendment-based academic research privilege
might find some of these statutes instructive in terms of either scope or
terminology.
For instance, Pennsylvania's statute governing child pornography
provides that it "does not apply to any material that is possessed,
controlled, brought or caused to be brought into this Commonwealth, or
presented for a bona fide educational, scientific, governmental or judicial
purpose. 10 6  Academic study of child pornography for purposes of
content analyses or quantification would seem to fall within either the
educational or scientific exemption, or both. 10 7  Like Pennsylvania,
Connecticut has a statutory exemption which provides that "[p]ossession
of a photographic or other visual reproduction of a nude minor for a bona
fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental or
judicial purpose shall not be a violation of this subsection."
10 8
Illinois's child pornography statute also has an exemption, although
it is more limited than either the Pennsylvania or Connecticut exemption.
In particular, it provides that a charge of "child pornography shall not
apply to the performance of official duties by law enforcement or
103. See United States v. Bryant, No. CR 92-35R (W.D. Wash. May 13, 1992)
(unpublished order) (permitting defendant to assert a similar defense as an academic
researcher).
104. United States v. Bunnell, Crim. No. 02-13-B-$2002, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8319, at
*3-7 (D. Me. May 1, 2002).
105. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312(f) (2001); see also CoNN. GEN. STAT. §
53a-196d(a) (2001).
106. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312(f) (emphasis added).
107. The author of this article found no Pennsylvania caselaw interpreting this
language that is directly on point.
108. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-196d (emphasis added).
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prosecuting officers, court personnel or attorneys, nor to bona fide
treatment or professional education programs conducted by licensed
physicians, psychologists or social workers."10 9 This exemption does not
appear to protect the study of child pornography by academics unless it is
in connection with a treatment or professional education program.
Nonetheless, it suggests that the state legislature of Illinois recognized
that there may be legitimate uses of child pornography that do not merit
criminal punishment. And, to the extent that psychologists are
specifically mentioned in the statute, there might be a willingness in the
future by the legislature to extend the privilege to other social scientists
engaged in legitimate academic research. Similarly, Wyoming has a
statutory exemption for certain individuals, like psychologists, who
possess child pornography in the course of conducting treatment
programs. 110
Under Indiana law, a charge of possession and/or dissemination of
child pornography does "not apply to a bona fide school, museum, or
public library that qualifies for certain property tax exemptions" or to "an
employee of such a school, museum, or public library acting within the
scope of the employee's employment when the possession of the listed
materials are for legitimate scientific or educational purposes."' ' It is
the emphasized language in which the seed of a privilege for Indiana
academic researchers exists.
In summary, some state statutes targeting child pornography have
carved out exceptions for particular legitimate uses of the materials.
While these exceptions vary from state to state, they nonetheless suggest
that there is room for the creation of a privilege exempting academic
researchers from punishment under both federal and state statutes.
E. An Opportunity Missed: The Case of Lawrence Matthews
In 2000, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected journalist
Lawrence Matthews's argument that the First Amendment provides a
defense to federal charges of distributing and possessing child
pornography when the use of the materials is for a "valid journalistic
purpose."'1 2  Matthews claimed that the child pornography he
109. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1 (2001) (emphasis added).
110. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-303 (Michie 2001) (providing that charges of
possession of child pornography do not apply to "[p]hysicians, psychologists, therapists
or social workers, provided such persons are duly licensed in Wyoming and the persons
possess such materials in the course of a bona fide treatment or evaluation program at the
treatment or evaluation site").
111. IND. CODE § 35-42-4-4 (2001).
112. United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 339 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 910 (2000). See generally Clay Calvert & Kelly Lyon, Reporting on Child
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downloaded from the Web and possessed was necessary for a freelance
investigative story that he was working on about "the nature and scope of
law enforcement efforts to eliminate child pornography." 1 3 Earlier in
his journalistic career, "while working as a business news reporter for
WTOP radio in Washington, D.C., Matthews produced a three-part radio
series highlighting the existence of child pornography on the Internet."
114
In his defense, Matthews argued that the First Amendment creates a
privilege to use child pornography as a research tool in the production of
a work of journalism. 15 This was an issue of first impression for the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 16 and it roundly rejected Matthews's
argument, including his reliance on Justice Stevens's concurrence in
Ferber.117 The Fourth Circuit wrote:
Justice Stevens cites no support for his comments and we have not
found a single case in which any court has explicitly held that a
proper or valid "use" of child pornography defeats its illegality. The
mischief that could result from a rule that a "good" use of child
pornography legitimizes the material itself is apparent.18
When the United States Supreme Court later denied Lawrence
Matthews's petition for writ of certiorari, 19 it missed the opportunity to
examine the possibility of creating a First Amendment-based research
privilege, be it for journalists researching newspaper articles or scholars
researching peer-reviewed publications. Both journalists and scholars
are in the business of producing and disseminating knowledge that helps
society. Had the Court accepted the case and created a privilege or a
defense for journalists to possess child pornography for legitimate
research purposes, that privilege easily could have been extended to
academics.
The guiding maxim for journalists today, however, flows from a
"well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement
against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report
the news."'120  The laws against transmission and receipt of child
pornography, of course, are generally applicable-they do not single out
Pornography: A First Amendment Defense for Viewing Illegal Images?, 89 KY. L.J. 13
(2000) (analyzing the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Matthews).
113. Matthews, 209 F.3d at 339.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 341.
116. Id. at 342.
117. See supra notes 87, 90-91 and accompanying text.
118. Matthews, 209 F.3d at 348.
119. Matthews v. United States, 531 U.S. 910 (2000).
120. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
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or target members of the press. The same principle thus holds true for
academics, leaving them, like Lawrence Matthews, without a privilege or
defense for the possession or transmission of child pornography.
F. Defining the Scope of a Research Privilege
With the creation of a privilege for academic researchers comes the
inevitable risk that it will be abused and exploited for inappropriate and
nefarious purposes by some scholars.12 1 It might be used, for instance, as
an excuse for some in academia to view child pornography when they are
not actually studying it. To reduce the chances of such non-academic
uses or, at least, to prevent individuals from escaping legal liability by
successfully claiming a privilege, limitations or conditions must be
placed on the scope of the research privilege.
The threshold condition on the privilege is that the researcher
invoking it must have been employed by an institution of higher
education at the time the alleged research involving child pornography
was conducted. Such employment provides an initial indication of
legitimacy of the research. It eliminates individuals who claim to be
scholars conducting their own so-called freelance research. Graduate
students working under the direct supervision of a faculty member or
researcher employed by an institution of higher education would also be
able to invoke the privilege.
A second condition, as noted earlier, is that the privilege must be
limited to studying photographs, images, films and videotapes that
already exist independently of the researcher. The academic
researcher's use, in these circumstances, would be considered
downstream and removed from the actual exploitation of the children
involved in the production of the images.1
22
The third condition flows from the second-no children can be used
in any experiments, surveys, or other studies involving child
pornography. They cannot be used either in its production or as
individuals who look at or review it. The purpose of this limitation, like
the second, is to protect children from both physical and psychological
harm.
A fourth limitation puts in place internal checks at the university
level to ensure that researchers are not simply surfing for child
pornography for their own gratification. In particular, the privilege must
be limited to scholars whose research projects involving images of child
pornography, after submission of a detailed description of their
121. See Matthews, 209 F.3d at 348.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94.
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methodology and purpose, receive prior approval by either the dean, the
department head, or the institution's office of regulatory compliance,
sometimes referred to as a human subjects committee or review board.
For example, the purpose of the Pennsylvania State University Office of
Regulatory Compliance is "to make Penn State a model for conducting
outstanding research in an atmosphere that promotes trust and respect
from both the academic community and the general public."'23  This
emphasized language is important because the public must trust that the
research conducted with child pornography has a legitimate purpose. In
turn, the purpose of these committees is to generate public trust and
ensure scholarly responsibility. When invoking the research privilege, a
scholar must have evidence that a department, dean, or internal review
board approved the project.
This quartet of conditions may not be exhaustive, but it provides
initial guidance for courts in fashioning a First Amendment-based
academic research privilege for the study of child pornography. The
imposition of other conditions must be done with the twin goals of
allowing academics freedom to conduct research while simultaneously
ensuring that the research is legitimate.
The next section returns to the core problem of defining child
pornography that was highlighted in the introduction of this article. In
particular, it examines a new phenomenon on the World Wide Web that
may push definitions of child pornography further than they now exist.
It already has, in fact, given rise to a new bill in the United States
Congress to address its proliferation. 1
24
III. Child Modeling Sites: They Are Not Illegal, but Should They Be?
With the entry of just one URL, http://www.childsuper
models.com, 125 a Web surfer is whisked away in cyberspace to a
collection of more than a dozen sites with photographs and, in some
cases, videos of young girls donning skimpy bikinis and short shorts
while they strike provocative poses. The sites, with names like "Jessi the
Kid," 12 6 "Lil' Amber" 127 and "Mollirama,"'' 12 most often are replete with
free preview galleries showing samples of their wares.
123. Pa. State Univ. Office of Regulatory Compliance, About ORC, at
http://www.research.psu.edu/orc/about.html (last visited May 29, 2002) (emphasis
added). As of July 2002 the ORC was renamed the Office for Research Protections. Id.
124. H.R. 4667, 107th Cong. (2002).
125. Child Super Models, at http://www.childsupermodels.com (last visited May 13,
2002). There are other collections of links to teen models. See, e.g., Galley Girls, at
http://thegalleygirls.com (last visited May 28, 2002).
126. Jessi the Kid, at http://www.jessithekid.com (last visited May 13, 2002).
127. Lil'Amber, at http://www.lilamber.com (last visited May 13, 2002).
128. Mollirama, at http://www.mollirama.com (last visited May 13, 2002).
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Another URL, http://www.stevescds.com/youth, takes one to a site
run by Steve Stewart Productions.1 29  From here, one can link to
photographs of thirteen-year-old "Myst,' 130  and twelve-year-old
"Mary.' 1 31 There are sample images of both young girls in tube tops and
minimal clothing. One can bid to purchase items of clothing worn by
"Myst," including swimsuits. 132 She will do "custom" photo shoots, and
tells customers: "I can wear tube tops, belly shirts, hip hugger jeans or
shorts. I can wear jeans and bikini tops I think that looks realy [sic] good
together."'
133
A special report in New York's Daily News recently described teen
and preteen modeling Web sites this way:
The sites-some featuring girls as young as 6-don't show nudity or
overt sexual acts, thereby breaking no child pom laws. Technically,
they show no more skin than a kid's bathing suit ad. But the child
modeling sites, which get thousands of hits per day, have a primary
audience of pedophiles. 1
34
An earlier MSNBC report about the "Lil' Amber" Web site
described its content as follows:
The shots showed "Amber" (which is not her real name) in bathing
suits, short skirts and skimpy halter tops, but never revealed any
genitalia or her breasts. Some of the photos were disturbing-such as
one in which she appeared to be rolled in clay-but others could just
as well have been from a backyard birthday party.
135
The same report described a videotape of Amber purchased by MSNBC
as showing the girl modeling:
[A] dozen different outfits during the dance-a-thon, apparently
fashions that were requested or purchased by Web site members. In
one scene, she lifted her skirt, giving the briefest glimpses of
underwear. In another, the unidentified cameraman lay on the floor
and shot up her skirt as she danced away un-self-consciously. That
129. Youth Models, at http://www.stevescds.com/youth (last visited May 23, 2002).
130. New Model Myst, at http://www.stevescds.com/youth/myst (last visited May 23,
2002). The model also has her own web site. Myst Model, at
http://www.mystmodel.com (last visited May 23, 2002).
131. Mary, at http://www.stevescds.com/youth/mary (last visited May 23, 2002).
132. Myst Model: Clothing Auction, at http://www.mystmodel.com/auction (last
visited May 23, 2002).
133. Myst Model: IDo Custom Photo Shoots, at http://www.mystmodel.com/
custom.html (last visited May 23, 2002).
134. Helen Kennedy, Parents Exposing Kids on Soft-Porn Web Sites, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), May 9, 2002, at 20.
135. Bunker, supra note 30.
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was as far as it went.
136
As of May 2002, a portion of the "Lil' Amber" site featured a
collection of "Preview Galleries" accessible free of charge. 137 At least
nine of these galleries, based on the "teaser" photographs posted,
featured the girl, apparently "Amber," in either swimwear or
underwear. 138  No nudity or close-crop shots around the breasts or
genitalia, however, appeared in any of the teaser photographs.
139
Membership was $25.00 for the first month of access, and then $19.95
for each month thereafter. 140 The members' section could be accessed
only with a password.
14 1
Perhaps none of this is surprising in an era of skin-baring Britney
Spears 142 and "a sex-soaked culture,"' 143 but the sites do raise questions.
Are there legal problems with such sites? What issues do they raise for
the law and legislative bodies concerned with protecting minors from
sexual exploitation? The next section addresses these questions.
A. The Issues Raised by Child Modeling Sites
Three critical issues, from a legal perspective, are raised by sites
such as "Lil' Amber" and its ilk:
1. Do they exploit the sexuality of minors for commercial gain?
2. Do they violate current laws on child pornography?
3. If they do not violate current laws against child pornography,
should those laws be revised to sweep up these sites?
136. Id.




140. Lil" Amber: Join/Order, at http://www.lilamber.com/join.htmI (last visited May
14, 2002).
141. Lil' Amber: Members, at http://www.lilamber.com/protect/members.html (last
visited May 14, 2002).
142. The now-twenty-years-old Spears embraces the role of teen nymphet, with a
recent article in the San Francisco Chronicle describing her as follows.
[A] whipless kitten longing to be eternal jailbait. Her lips are as pink as fresh
bubblegum, her voice as modulated as Minnie Mouse's, her sexuality still that
of the calculating nymphet. Humbert Humbert would be the first to say that, at
20, she's too old to play the Lolita role, but Britney offers little to replace it.
Neva Chonin, The Divas: From Girls to Women, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 7, 2002, at 60.
143. Kim Painter, The Sexual Revolution Hits Junior High, USA TODAY, Mar. 15,
2002, at 1A.
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The answer to the first question appears to be a resounding yes. The
appeal of these for-profit sites, each of which requires payment to access
a full catalogue of images, is sexual. The sheer amount of young flesh
shown in many "teaser" pictures is testament to this fact. As Nancy
McBride, director of Florida's National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children, told reporters for a Florida television station investigating the
child modeling sites: "I truly believe these children are being
exploited," 144 adding that the sites are "putting these kids on a platter
' 14 5
in ways that are "definitely very provocative."'146 The operator of the
"Child Super Models" jump station and owner of a number of the
modeling sites would argue otherwise. In a lengthy online missive, the
so-called "Webmaster" of the "Child Super Models" site, owned by
Webe Web Corp., 147 writes:
I know for a fact that these models are not being harmed or
endangered any more then any other child in public exposure. Why
not get the parents of the Olsen twins to testify? Besides, every day
there are children being abused thru [sic] out the country who do not
have any connections to websites. There has never been one shred of
evidence that any of these models on our sites have been harmed
because as a matter of fact they have not! 1
48
However, it is important from a legal perspective to reject this self-
serving line of reasoning and accept that there may be some
psychological harm to a child who, in later life, realizes how her
sexuality was exploited by her parents for profit. The Supreme Court, in
the context of holding child pornography outside the scope of First
Amendment protection, found that "[t]he prevention of sexual
exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of
surpassing importance.' 49 And, while the minors used in the production
of child modeling sites do not in any way appear to be physically abused,
physical abuse is not the only harm about which the Court is
concerned. 150 It is also concerned with the psychological well-being of
minors who may be scarred emotionally when their sexuality is
144. NBC 6 Investigates: Selling Innocence (NBC 6 television broadcast, Nov. 8,
2001), available at http://www.nbc6.net/nbc6investigates/1315942/detail.html.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Webe Web, based in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, is run by Marc Greenberg and
Jeff Libman and operates eight child modeling Web sites. NBC 6 Investigates: Selling
Innocence Follow-up: What Happened After Our Story (NBC 6 television broadcast,
Dec. 3, 2001), available at http://www.nbc6.net/News/ 1315989/detail.html.
148. Child Super Models: Webmasters Opinion on News Stuff, at
http://www'jessithekid.com/thoughts.html (last visited May 13, 2002).
149. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
150. See id. at 756-57.
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exploited.1 51 Furthermore, the Court holds that child pornography is
abusive, in part, because the images "produced are a permanent record of
the children's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by
their circulation."' 
52
When it comes to child modeling sites, all of these concerns appear
to be present. The images certainly constitute a permanent record of a
child's participation in the production of images that exploit his or her
sexuality for commercial gain. Those images, in turn, are circulated
nationwide and beyond, conceivably forever, via the World Wide Web.
In a nutshell, the harms that have long justified laws against child
pornography appear to be present with child modeling sites.
Even if these sites exploit the sexuality of minors for profit, much
like child pornography, the second question posed earlier in this section
must be addressed: Are they illegal under current child pornography
laws? The answer, in contrast to the first question, would appear to be
no, at least based on the "teaser" photographs viewed by the author of
this article. The Webmaster of "Child Super Models" is most likely
correct when he writes that "[w]e are not breaking the law."'
153
How can this be the case? To constitute child pornography under
federal law, there must be some form of "sexually explicit conduct."'
' 54
This conduct may take the form of either, an activity like "sexual
intercourse,"' ' 55 "masturbation,"' 156 or a display that constitutes a
"lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area."'157 In interpreting
this last phrase, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Knox 58 held that nudity is not required for there to be lascivious
exhibition of the genitals "when a photographer unnaturally focuses on
minor child's clothed genital area with the obvious intent to produce an
image sexually arousing to pedophiles."' 59 Other appellate courts agree
that freeze framing and focusing on a partially clothed minor's pubic
area such that it becomes the center of an image may constitute a
lascivious exhibition.' 60  Courts considering whether an exhibition is
151. Id.
152. Id. at 759.
153. Child Super Models: Webmasters Opinion on News Stuff, at
http://www.jessithekid.com/thoughts.html (last visited May 13, 2002).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2002).
155. Id. § 2256(2)(A).
156. Id. § 2256(2)(C).
157. Id. § 2256(2)(E) (emphasis added).
158. 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994).
159. Id. at 750. In Knox, the Third Circuit observed that "the photographer has
focused unnaturally on the genitals of the young girls in close-up shots which reveal the
outer contours of the genitals through their tight bathing suits, leotards or underwear."
Id. at 746 n.11.
160. See United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 790 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that, in
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lascivious in a child pornography case may also apply the so-called Dost
factors that take into account the focal point and setting of the image, the
pose of the minor in that setting, the suggestive sexuality of the
depiction, and the intent of the image to elicit a sexual response in the
viewer. 161
None of the images available via the free preview galleries feature
sexual activities like intercourse and masturbation.1 62  Furthermore,
although they may depict young girls in bikinis and other revealing attire,
they do not focus or center on the genital area. As such, the sites would
appear to be legal under federal child pornography laws since there is no
sexually explicit conduct. As Ray Smith, head of the United States
Postal Inspector Program for Child Exploitation, told a reporter in May
2002, the material is "not illegal.' 63
Looking back to the questions posed at the start of this section, it
appears that child modeling sites do exploit the sexuality of minors for
commercial gain, yet they do not constitute child pornography under
current federal law. This situation forces consideration of the third
question: Should child pornography laws be revised to prohibit the child
modeling sites? The answer to this question, at least in the eyes of two
members of Congress, is yes. The proposed bill, 164 which would do just
that, is described and analyzed in the next section.
B. The Child Modeling Exploitation Prevention Act of 2002
For Representative Mark Foley, a Florida Republican and the co-
founder of the Congressional Missing and Exploited Children's Caucus,
the need to ban child modeling sites is clear: "With all that's happening
in the church today-and with the news about trusted people like
coaches and teachers getting caught in child porn stings-it really
sickens you to realize that parents are dangling their own kids out there
as candy for some sick mind."
' 165
That is why Representatives Foley and Nick Lampson, a Texas
certain "beach scenes, the girls are wearing swimsuit bottoms, but a reasonable jury could
conclude that the exhibition of the pubic area was lascivious despite this minimal
clothing because of the way in which the pictures are framed" and admonishing that "[b]y
focusing the viewer's attention on the pubic area, freeze-framing can create an image
intended to elicit a sexual response in the viewer").
161. United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986). These factors
were adopted by the Third Circuit in Knox. 32 F.3d at 746.
162. See, e.g., Lil' Amber: Gallery, at http://www.lilamber.com/preview.html (last
visited May 14, 2002).
163. Kennedy, supra note 134, at 20.




Democrat, sponsored a bill in May 2002 to ban child modeling sites.
16 6
As Representative Foley stated in a press release announcing the Child
Modeling Exploitation Prevention Act of 2002 ("CMEPA"), the sites
"don't sell products, they don't sell services-all they serve are young
children on a platter for America's most depraved. These sites sell child
erotica and they must be banned immediately."
'1 67
To accomplish that goal, the CMEPA would add a new section to
the current federal child pornography statutes. The new section, to be
dubbed "Exploitive Child Modeling," would provide as follows:
Whoever displays, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, the
image of a child who has not attained the age of 17 years, with the
intent to make a financial gain thereby, or offers, in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce, to provide an image of such a child
with the intent to make a financial gain thereby, without a purpose of
marketing a product or service other than an image of a child model,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both. 1
68
According to the bill, Congress finds that "[t]he use of children in
the production of exploitive child modeling, including on Internet
websites, in photographs, films, videos, and other visual depictions, is a
form of child abuse that can result in physical and psychological harm to
the children involved" 169 and that "[t]he purpose of exploitive child
modeling is to satisfy the demand of pedophiles. 1 70  Congress is
concerned, according to the bill, that "exploitive child modeling may
involve a direct and personal interaction between the child model and the
pedophile. The pedophile often knows the child's name and has a way of
communicating with the child."17'
The bill also calls for amending section 12 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938172 and the laws on oppressive child labor 173 to
make it illegal to use a minor in the production of child modeling sites.
174
In particular, the bill provides that "[n]o employer may employ a minor
under 17 years old to work in exploitive child modeling."
'1 75
166. Press Release, Office of Rep. Mark Foley, Foley Announces Bill To Ban So-







172. 29 U.S.C. § 212 (2002).
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While the effort to regulate child modeling sites like "Lil' Amber"
and "Mollirama" may be well intended, especially considering their
exploitation of preteen sexuality, this does not make the CMEPA exempt
from judicial scrutiny should it be enacted. To decide what standard of
scrutiny courts would apply, an initial determination must be made as to
whether the CMEPA is content neutral or content based.176 Content-
based laws 177 whose "application depends on either the subject matter or
the viewpoint expressed"'178 are presumptively unconstitutional.
79
Content-neutral laws "that are unrelated to the content of speech are
subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny."' 8 °
The CMEPA singles out a particular type of subject matter for
regulation-images, displayed with the intent of financial gain, of
children under the age of seventeen who model "without a purpose of
marketing a product or service other than an image of a child model.'
18'
In contrast, the display of these same images for financial gain with the
purpose of marketing a product or service other than the images is not
regulated. 82  Such is the apparent distinction the bill makes between
exploitive and non-exploitive child modeling. The fact that this
distinction is intentional is clarified by the congressional findings that
accompany the bill. These findings provide that "[e]xploitive child
modeling is different from other, legitimate, child modeling because
exploitive child modeling involves marketing the child himself or herself
in lascivious positions and acts, rather than actually marketing products
to average American consumers."'
' 83
As a content-based law that favors speech advertising products and
services over speech that merely advertises children themselves, 184 the
CMEPA would be subject to a strict scrutiny standard of review.
81
176. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 758
(1997) (writing that the United States Supreme Court "has invoked the content-
based/content-neutral distinction as the basis for its decisions" in "countless First
Amendment cases").
177. See generally Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent
Applications of an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 69 (1997)
(discussing judicial scrutiny of content-based and content-neutral laws).
178. Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of
Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 51 (2000).
179. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (providing that
"[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid").
180. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
181. H.R. 4667, 107th Cong. (2002) (emphasis added).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. "As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content-based."
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642.
185. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-84, 404 (1992) (providing that
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Therefore, the government must prove: (1) that it is based on a
compelling interest such as protecting minors from psychological or
physical abuse and (2) that the statute restricts no more speech than is
necessary to advance the interest effectively. 186 First, in terms of harm,
the congressional findings embodied in the bill assert two types of harm
to children: physical and psychological.187 The physical harm suggested
in the findings does not occur in the actual production of the images of
exploitive child pornography themselves, but rather in the potential that
"exploitive child modeling can place the child in danger of being
abducted, abused, or murdered by pedophiles who view such
depictions."' 88 How the psychological harm occurs to minors is not
articulated in the findings that accompany the CMEPA. It may be,
however, that Congress is concerned that psychological harm occurs to
minors who realize, either as children or later in life, that their bodies and
sexuality have been exploited for the profits of others.
89
Would these two types of harm-physical harm from pedophiles
who either contact child models or whose appetites are whetted by child
modeling sites, and psychological harm caused in the production of the
images-constitute compelling interests necessary to withstand judicial
scrutiny? While the Supreme Court has made it clear that "there is a
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-
being of minors,"'190 its recent decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition19 1 casts some doubt about whether the physical harm allegedly
caused by exploitive child modeling sites would constitute a compelling
interest. In Free Speech Coalition, the government argued that, although
children were not physically harmed in the production of virtual child
pornography, the virtual images could lead to physical abuse by
encouraging and whetting the appetites of pedophiles. 92  The Court
rejected these "indirect harms,"' 193 reasoning that "the causal link is
contingent and indirect. The harm does not necessarily follow from the
speech, but depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent
criminal acts."' 94 Citing its decision in Hess v. Indiana,'95 the Court in
"[clontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid").
186. See United States v. Playboy Entm't. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(providing that, "[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling Government interest").
187. H.R. 4667.
188. Id.
189. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759-60 (1982).
190. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
191. 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002)-
192. Id. at 1403.
193. Id. at 1402.
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
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Free Speech Coalition added that "[t]he government may not prohibit
speech because it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed
'at some indefinite future time."' 196
The physical harm that justifies the CMEPA is similar to the
indirect and speculative physical harm that supported the Child
Pornography Prevention Act held unconstitutional in Free Speech
Coalition. The idea that exploitive child modeling sites might lead to
contact between pedophiles and child models or might whet the appetite
of pedophiles actually to molest other children does not make these
outcomes either likely or inevitable. Like the physical harm allegedly
caused by virtual child pornography, the physical harm allegedly caused
by child modeling sites depends upon some unquantified potential for
subsequent criminal acts.' 97  The Supreme Court concluded in Free
Speech Coalition that "[t]he mere tendency of speech to encourage
unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it.' 198 So too might a
court reason that the tendency of exploitive modeling sites to lead to
downstream physical abuse of minors is not a sufficient reason for
banning them.
If courts reject as speculative the physical abuse interest that
supports the CMEPA, then the interest left to support the bill is the
psychological harm caused to minors in the production of the images and
in the potentially indefinite dissemination of those images. 199 One might
question whether psychological harm actually occurs in the production of
such images, since they do not involve sexual conduct as defined under
existing child pornography laws.200 Does posing for a saleable picture in
a swimsuit cause harm to minors? 201 Does it really make a difference in
terms of harm to the child whether or not the picture is designed to sell a
product or service other than the picture itself? While a court might
defer to congressional judgment in this matter, it might also request some
sort of evidence-perhaps evidence from the social sciences-that the
production and/or dissemination of such images can cause psychological
harm. In other words, it is not a given that a court would accept as
common sense that psychological harm necessarily occurs to the minors
196. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1403 (citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105,
108 (1973)).
197. Id. at 1402.
198. Id. at 1403.
199. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57, 759 (1982).
200. Supra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
201. One might question whether the young girls who pose in swimsuits sold online
by J.C. Penney are harmed because, arguably, their young beauty is being exploited,
albeit in the name of selling a product. See J.C. Penney Co., Inc., J.C. Penney Children's
Department, at http://wwwl.jcpenney.com/jcp/Default.aspx (last visited May 21, 2002).
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used in exploitive child modeling sites.2 °2 If this is the case, then it is
also not a given that a compelling interest really exists to support the
CMEPA.
Second, assuming for the sake of argument that courts conclude that
there is a compelling interest to support the CMEPA, the statute must
still be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.20 3 This means that it must
be "the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.,
204
Under this prong of the strict scrutiny test, the statute might face another
challenge. In particular, the proposed statute is designed to protect
children under the age of seventeen from the reach of pedophiles; 20 5 yet,
pedophiles, by definition, generally target prepubescent children.20 6 As
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines it, the
"paraphiliac focus of Pedophilia involves sexual activity with a
prepubescent child (generally age 13 years of age or younger)"20 7 with
"[t]hose attracted to females usually prefer[ing] 8 to 10-year-olds. 2 °s To
the extent that the CMEPA attempts to protect minors ages fourteen
through sixteen, the law is not narrowly tailored since children of these
ages are not the targets of pedophiles. The law, in other words, is
overinclusive. Individuals attracted to teenagers are not called
pedophiles but are said to suffer from ephebophilia, which is too
common to be classified as an illness. 20 9  Perhaps lowering the
application of the statute to children under the age of fourteen would
more narrowly tailor the statute and increase its chances of passing
constitutional muster.
In addition to review under the two prongs of the strict scrutiny
analysis, the CMEPA would be subject to facial challenges of
overbreadth and vagueness. The Supreme Court has held "that in the
area of freedom of expression an overbroad regulation may be subject to
facial review and invalidation., 210 In particular, a statute may be deemed
overbroad if it "sweeps too broadly, penalizing a substantial amount of
202. Cf Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir.
2001) (writing that "[clommon sense is sometimes another word for prejudice"), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 462 (2001).
203. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(providing that, "[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling Government interest").
204. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
205. Supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
206. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 527 (4th ed. 1994).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Cloud, supra note 49, at 43.
210. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992).
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speech that is constitutionally protected., 2 1 The vagueness doctrine, on
the other hand, prohibits the enforcement of "a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. ' '21 2 Vague laws restricting expression are of special
First Amendment concern because of their "obvious chilling effect on
free speech."2t 3
The CMEPA appears rife with overbreadth problems, sweeping up
speech that is protected by the First Amendment. For instance, some
photographs of minors in swimwear, underwear, or even less clothing
that are targeted by the CMEPA may, in fact, be considered art by
aficionados who purchase and collect photographs.214 The CMEPA,
however, does not include an artistic value exception for photographs or
images of young children sold by photographers or galleries. 215  The
United States Supreme Court's three-part test for obscenity, from Miller
216v. California, in contrast, specifically protects sexually explicit images
of adults that possess "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." 217 The absence of an artistic value exception in the CMEPA may
be pivotal in determining its constitutionality. In striking down the Child
Pornography Prevention Act's ("CPPA") ban on virtual child
pornography as overbroad in April 2002, the Supreme Court in Free
Speech Coalition specifically observed that "[t]he CPPA prohibits speech
211. Id. at 130.
212. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
213. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997).
214. The work of controversial professional photographers like Jock Sturges and
David Hamilton often portrays images of children in little or no attire, but such images
are considered art by many. See Jerry Cullum, The Bare Essentials of Romanticism,
ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Apr. 26, 2002, at 7Q (reviewing and praising a display of
Sturges's photographs for sale in Atlanta while noting that they "present successive years
in the life of adolescents, who gradually become adults with interesting character traits"
and that "[m]ost of these changes are shown in the context of nude studies of young
women").
Sturges's home was the subject in 1990 of an FBI raid during which federal
agents reportedly seized more than 100,000 negatives. David Allyn, Nudity and the
Censors, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 1998, at A23. A grand jury ultimately refused to
indict in that matter. Id. See generally Brian Verbon Cash, Images of Innocence or
Guilt?: The Status of Laws Regulating Child Pornography on the Federal Level and in
Alabama and an Evaluation of the Case Against Barnes & Noble, 51 ALA. L. REV. 793
(2000) (examining the legal status of the works of David Hamilton and Jock Sturges
under Alabama's obscenity and child pornography laws).
215. The problem of the statute sweeping up legitimate art is more than just a
speculative problem, as "[tjhe child as sexual subject has emerged as a major force in
artistic culture." Adler, supra note 52, at 254. As Professor Amy Adler notes, "[b]est-
selling, high-art photographer Sally Mann takes erotic nudes of her prepubescent
children." Id.
216. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
217. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
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despite its serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value., 218 The
Court was concerned that "[a]ny depiction of sexually explicit activity,
no matter how it is presented, is proscribed ' 219 and observed that the
CPPA extended to images without regard to the Miller requirements of
(1) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work appeals to prurient interest, (2)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by state law, and (3) whether the
work lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 220 The
Court in Free Speech Coalition went on to emphasize the importance of
protecting works of art. 2 1
Even more recently, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court in
Ashcroft v. ACL U,222  found problematic the fact that the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), held unconstitutional in Reno v.
ACLU,223 "did not include any limiting terms resembling Miller's
additional two prongs... [in that it] neither contained any requirement
that restricted material appeal to the prurient interest nor excluded from
the scope of its coverage works with serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value. 224 In contrast, Justice Thomas lauded the Child Online
Protection Act ("COPA") for including such language from Miller.225
Given the Court's recent concern with the inclusion and exclusion
of statutory language relating to the artistic value of sexually explicit
speech, the Court would likely be concerned that the CMEPA does not
include a Miller-like exemption for works that possess serious artistic
value. The addition of such language might increase the CMEPA's odds
of surviving judicial review.
In addition to the statute's failure to include an exemption for
artistic images, there may be yet another overbreadth problem. This
problem is connected to the display of newsworthy photographs. In
particular, the news media may purchase a photograph of a minor in a
swimsuit or underwear to accompany a newsworthy story, be it a story
about exploitive child modeling sites or about another subject.
Newspapers, in turn, can be said to display the photographs for a profit
because newspapers typically are not free. This dissemination of
photographs would technically violate the CMEPA.226
218. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1400 (2002).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1399 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
221. Id. at 1400-01.
222. 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002).
223. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
224. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. at 1709.
225. Id. at 1709-10.
226. See H.R. 4667, 107th Cong. (2002) (requiring a financial gain or an intent to
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Courts have recognized, however, that the news media should not
be held civilly accountable for printing photographs in connection with
newsworthy stories. For instance, the tort of public disclosure of private
facts 227 includes a newsworthiness element that exempts materials "of
legitimate public concern" 228 from its reach. Courts have articulated
factors to define the otherwise abstract
229 concept of newsworthiness.
230
The Supreme Court in Bartnicki v. Vopper23 1 recently reiterated its
concern with protecting the press when the press publishes truthful
information about matters of significant public concern.232 This Supreme
Court standard might require that the CMEPA include an exemption for
publication and display of images sold or offered for sale in connection
with newsworthy stories, defined as those stories concerning a matter of
public significance or legitimate public concern.
In terms of a facial challenge on vagueness grounds, the CMEPA
does not define the term "child model. 233  While the congressional
"Findings" section of the CMEPA provides that exploitive child
modeling involves a child in "lascivious positions and acts, 234 such
defining language is not included within the terms of the proposed
federal statute itself. The term "child model" needs to be defined more
make a financial gain).
227. This tort is sometimes referred to as "publication of truthful but embarrassing
facts." ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS
552 (1994). The basic common law elements of the tort are set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
228. See generally Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 1998)
("If the contents of a broadcast or publication are of legitimate public concern, the
plaintiff cannot establish a necessary element of the tort action, the lack of
newsworthiness.") (emphasis added).
229. That the concept of newsworthiness is abstract is reflected in the trouble that
journalists have in defining the root concept of news. See KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON &
KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL, THE INTERPLAY OF INFLUENCE: NEWS, ADVERTISING,
POLITICS AND THE MASS MEDIA 40 (5th ed. 2001) (writing that, "[d]espite many efforts,
no neat, satisfactory answer" to the question of how to define news "has been found" and
concluding that "[t]he best answer seems to be that news is what reporters, editors, and
producers decide is news").
230. See generally Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (writing that the test for newsworthiness should include the social value of
the facts published, the depth of the intrusion into private affairs, and the extent to which
the plaintiff voluntarily rose to a position of public notoriety).
231. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
232. Id at 526-27.




precisely and narrowly in terms of the types of sexually exploitive and
suggestive images that the bill's sponsors hope to restrict. This
definition would also help to more narrowly tailor the sweep of the
statute for purposes of the strict scrutiny standard of review described
above.235
Finally, in terms of judicial scrutiny, one more point about the
CMEPA is worth noting. In particular, the bill gives more protection to
commercial speech 236 than to non-commercial speech. This is highly
ironic because commercial speech, although protected by the First
Amendment,237 typically receives less protection than other forms of
expression such as art.238  By its terms, the CMEPA does not protect
those images of minors sold "without a purpose of marketing a product
or service other than an image of a child model. '239 By extension, then,
it conversely protects images of minors in swimwear or underwear that
propose a commercial transaction of some product or service
independent of the child's own image. A statement by Representative
Foley, the sponsor of the bill, acknowledges as much: "If a child is
modeling for Gap or Gucci, it's legal. If the site is selling nothing else
than the child via photos or video clips, it's illegal. 24 ° Courts may find
it somewhat troubling that commercial speech is privileged under this
law whereas non-commercial speech, such as the sale of photographs of
children that do not propose a commercial transaction for a product or
service, is disfavored.
In summary, the CMEPA, as originally proposed by Representative
Foley, is well-intended legislation to address a real and growing problem
on the World Wide Web. Whether it withstands judicial review,
however, is exceedingly doubtful. Put differently, the goals may be
compelling, but the means to effectuate them are troublesome.
Substantial revision of the terminology will be necessary for any law
targeting child modeling sites to survive review by the nation's courts.
235. Supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
236. The United States Supreme Court typically defines commercial speech as speech
that proposes a commercial transaction. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60,
66 (1983); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 885-86 (noting that, although
commercial speech is defined as that which proposes a commercial transaction, there are
problems with this definition).
237. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 122 S. Ct. 1497, 1503-04 (2002)
(observing that, "[a]lthough commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, not
all regulation of such speech is unconstitutional").
238. See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY
ARGUMENTS 233 (2001) (writing that commercial speech "is less protected than other
forms of speech").
239. H.R. 4667, 107th Cong. (2002).
240. Kennedy, supra note 134, at 20.
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IV. Conclusion
No reasonable person would question the twin premises that child
pornography is a problem and that it must be eradicated. What this
article has questioned, however, is both how to study child pornography
and how to regulate it. In particular, the article has evaluated blanket
federal laws that criminally punish academics for studying this form of
illegal content. In the process, it has proposed and crafted a solution to
address the situation: opening up a judicially created academic research
privilege grounded in First Amendment principles of academic freedom.
In addition, the article has examined the potential expansion of federal
laws against child pornography to sweep up exploitive child modeling
sites. In particular, it has argued that these sites must be. regulated, yet
criticized the Child Modeling Exploitation Prevention Act, as currently
drafted, as an unconstitutional vehicle for solving the problem.
Whether it is the child modeling sites addressed in this article or
other Web-driven problems like the euphemistically known "Lolita"
sites, patterned after the character in the Vladimir Nabokov novel by the
same name,2 41 constructing and defining child pornography are critical
issues that must be addressed today by scholars, legislatures, and courts.
More importantly, they must be addressed by a society not afraid to
study and to understand the issues that confront it. Congress should be
given credit for confronting the problem of child modeling sites,
especially at a time when the sexualization of children,242 from ihe
lt t 243  244clothes they wear to the media images they see, is increasing. Now
Congress must take the time to figure out constitutional measures for
shutting these sites down.
241. See generally Robert Grove & Blaise Zerega, The Lolita Problem: Illegal Child
Pornography Is Booming, Thanks to the Internet-And the Unwitting Support of
Corporate America, RED HERRING, Jan. 18, 2002, at 47 (discussing the proliferation of
so-called "Lolita" Web sites). A discussion of these sites is beyond the scope of this
article. That they are not addressed in this article, however, does not imply that they are
not worthy of either study or regulation.
242. See generally Kate Zernike, School Dress Codes vs. a Sea of Bare Flesh, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 11, 2001, at Al (describing what some perceive as the "rampant
sexualization of teenagers" and how it has affected the manner in which children dress).
243. See Emily Wax, Parents Can't Bear Girls' Skimpy Attire; MidriffFlashing
Clothes Bring Quick Veto from Schools, Too, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2001, at At (writing
that "the classics of young girls' clothing are being supplemented--or replaced-by
tighter, flashier and sexually alluring attire").
244. Clothing for young girls, for instance, is becoming increasingly skimpier.
Abercrombie & Fitch was selling "kiddie G-strings, which include pictures of cherries
and hearts" in 2002, although the company maintains the items are simply "cute and fun
and sweet." Darrell Giles & James Mills, Too Much Too Soon-Outcry over G-strings
for Girls as Young as 7, SUNDAY MAIL, May 26, 2002, at 25.
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